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Abstract—Recently, Sidford, Wang, Wu and Ye (2018) de-
veloped an algorithm combining variance reduction techniques
with value iteration to solve discounted Markov decision pro-
cesses. This algorithm has a sublinear complexity when the
discount factor is fixed. Here, we extend this approach to mean-
payoff problems, including both Markov decision processes
and perfect information zero-sum stochastic games. We obtain
sublinear complexity bounds, assuming there is a distinguished
state which is accessible from all initial states and for all policies.
Our method is based on a reduction from the mean payoff
problem to the discounted problem by a Doob h-transform,
combined with a deflation technique. The complexity analysis
of this algorithm uses at the same time the techniques developed
by Sidford et al. in the discounted case and non-linear spectral
theory techniques (Collatz-Wielandt characterization of the
eigenvalue).
I. INTRODUCTION
Context. Markov decision processes, and more generally
zero-sum two player stochastic games, are classical models
to study sequential problems under uncertainty [1, 2]. They
appear in various applications ranging from engineering
sciences, finance, economy, to health care or ecology. The
dynamic programming method allows one to reduce the
infinite horizon problem, in which players optimize a dis-
counted payoff, to a fixed point problem, involving an order
preserving and contracting map, called Bellman or Shapley
operator. Value iteration and policy iteration [1] are two
fundamental dynamic programming methods. The execution
time of these two algorithms is generally super-linear in the
size of the input, and it is desirable to develop accelerated
algorithms, for well structured huge scale instances.
Algorithms based on Monte-Carlo simulations can lead
to improved scalability. In a recent progress, Sidford et
al. [3] combined value iteration algorithm with sampling and
variance reduction techniques. They obtained an algorithm
for discounted infinite-horizon MDPs that, remarkably, is
sublinear in a certain relevant regime of the parameters.
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In the mean payoff problem, the discount factor tends to 1
and the bounds of execution time for value iteration blow up
which excludes to pass to the limit in the algorithm of [3].
Contribution. In the present paper, we study a class of
two-player mean payoff problems, and we still obtain a
sublinear complexity result. This applies in particular to the
mean payoff problems for MDPs, which correspond to the
special one-player case.
To do so, we exploit a general method, first introduced
in a previous work of two of the authors [4], allowing one
to reduce a class of mean payoff problems to discounted
problems. In this way, complexity results concerning the
discounted problem can be transferred (with some additional
work) to the mean payoff case.
This reduction combines a scaling argument (a combina-
torial version of Doob’s h-transform arising in the boundary
theory of Markov processes [5]) and a deflation technique: to
a mean payoff problem, we associate a discounted problem,
with a state-dependent discount rate (Thm. 4). Another key
idea is the use of weighted sup-norms, in order to obtain
contraction rates for this new Shapley operator. Then, we
solve the mean payoff problem by calling twice a variant of
the algorithm of Sidford’s et al. [3]: we call first this variant
to compute the diagonal scaling involved in our reduction,
and then to solve the discounted game obtained after the
reduction. We also note that the present variant includes an
extension of the algorithm of [3] for one player to the two-
player case, this is an easier matter—the main novelty here is
rather the reduction from the mean payoff problem to value
iteration in the discounted case.
The subclass of problems to which our method applies
requires the existence of a distinguished state c to which all
other states have access, for all policies of the two players.
The maximum of the hitting time of this state, for all policies,
appears in our complexity bound. There are instances in
which this maximal hitting time is O(1), and then we end
up with a sublinear regime.
Weighted sup-norms were already used by Bertsekas and
Tsitsiklis to obtain contraction results for value iteration in
the case of stochastic shortest path problems [6]. Our main
results include Thm. 1 and Cor. 1, which characterize the
best contraction rate, with respect to all possible weighted
sup-norms, as the Collatz-Wielandt number of a certain
convex monotone positively homogeneous map which we
call the “Clarke recession function”. This also implies that
a contraction estimate previous computed in [4] is indeed
optimal, if all the actions are “useful” in a natural sense.
Comparison with other approaches. Gupta, Jain and
Glynn have recently developed a Monte-Carlo version of
relative value iteration to solve mean payoff problems [7].
The convergence analysis requires the Bellman operator be a
strict contraction in the “span seminorm”. This is a demand-
ing condition. For instance, in the 0-player case, this requires
the transition matrix to be primitive, where our reduction
holds in more general circumstances (the uniqueness of the
final class suffices). Wang developed in [8] an algorithm
for mean-payoff MDPs (one player), that has a sublinear
bound. This algorithm depends on a mixing time and on a
parameter τ measuring the distance between the invariant
measures attached to different policies (the mixing times
of [8] should not be confused with the hitting times used
here, the finiteness of the former implies the finiteness of
the latter, but not vice versa). There are instances in which
the distance τ is exponential in the input size, whereas the
hitting time is linear.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we recall
basic notions about zero-sum games. In Section III, we
present the main techniques allowing the reduction from the
mean payoff case to the discounted case. In Section IV, we
present an adaptation of the variance reduction algorithm
of [3], allowing us to handle the operators obtained after the
deflation and h-transform reduction. In Section V, we derive
the sublinear bounds for classes of mean payoff problems.
Examples are presented in Section VI. Most proofs are
omitted owing to the space constraint.
II. DYNAMIC PROGRAMMING OPERATORS
A. Shapley operators of perfect information zero-sum
stochastic games with general discount factor
We refer the reader to [2] for background on stochastic
games. We next briefly recall the main notions and proper-
ties.
A perfect information two-player zero-sum stochastic
game with general discount (SG) is described by the follow-
ing data. We consider a finite state space S := {1, . . . , n}.
For all i ∈ S, Ai is a finite set representing the possible
actions of player MIN in state i, and Bi,a is a finite set
representing the possible actions of player MAX in state
i, when player MIN just played action a. We denote by
E := {(i, a, b) | i ∈ S, a ∈ Ai, b ∈ Bi,a} the set of all
admissible triples state-actions. For all (i, a, b) ∈ E, P abi
is an element of ∆(S) the set of probability measures on
S; we shall identify P abi to a row vector in R
n, writing
P abi = (P
ab
ij )j∈S where P
ab
ij is the transition probability to
the next state j, given the current state i and the actions taken
a ∈ Ai, b ∈ Bi,a. For all (i, a, b) ∈ E, rabi is a reward (real
number) that MIN pays to MAX, and γabi (real nonnegative
number) is a discount factor. We define
R := max
(i,a,b)∈E
|rabi | ∈ R+, Γ := max
(i,a,b)∈E
γabi ∈ (0,∞) ,
where R+ := {x ∈ R | x > 0}. We allow γabi to take values
larger than 1. The term turn-based is sometimes used as a
synonym of “perfect information”. This is in contrast with
the more general model of Shapley’s imperfect information
stochastic games in which two players play simultaneously
with randomized actions, see e.g. [9].
Recall that a strategy of a player is a decision rule which
associates to a history of the game an admissible action of
this player. A strategy σ of player Min, a strategy τ of player
Max, and an initial state i, alltogether determine a random
process (iℓ, aℓ, bℓ)ℓ>0 with values in E: iℓ represents the
state at step ℓ, and aℓ, bℓ represent the actions of the two
players at the same state. We require that i0 = i. We denote
by Ei,σ,τ the expectation with respect to the probability
measure governing this process. Given a finite horizon k, we
consider the zero-sum game in which the payoff of player
Max is given by
Jki (σ, τ) = Ei,σ,τ
(
k−1∑
ℓ=0
( ℓ−1∏
m=0
γambmim )r
aℓbℓ
il
)
. (1)
The value vki of the k-stage game starting from i is defined
as
vki := inf
σ
sup
τ
Jki (σ, τ) = sup
τ
inf
σ
Jki (σ, τ) , (2)
where the infima and suprema are taken over the set of
strategies of both players. By definition, the existence of the
value requires the infimum and the supremum to commute.
A pair of strategies σ∗, τ∗ is said to be optimal if σ∗
achieves the first infimum in (2) and if τ∗ achieves the second
supremum in (2).
For all (i, a, b) ∈ E, we set Mabij := γ
ab
i P
ab
ij and M
ab
i :=
(Mabij )j∈S ∈ R
n.
Definition 1. For a given SG, the Shapley operator T is the
map Rn → Rn whose ith coordinate is given by
Ti(v) = min
a∈Ai
max
b∈Bi,a
{
rabi +
∑
j∈S
Mabij vj
}
, i ∈ S, v ∈ Rn .
It is known that the value vector vk = (vki )i∈S does exist
and satisfies
vk = T (vk−1) , v0 = 0 . (3)
Relations of this form are often established when the dis-
count factor is constant [2], they remain valid for general
functionals of the form (1) with state and action dependent
factors, see Chapter 11 of [10]. Note that the assumption
that the discount factor be smaller than 1 is not needed for
the well posedness of the finite horizon problem and for the
validity of (3).
Similarly, one can consider the infinite horizon discounted
zero-sum game, in which the payoff of player Max is now
Ji(σ, τ) = Ei,σ,τ
( ∞∑
ℓ=0
( ℓ−1∏
m=0
γambmim )r
aℓbℓ
iℓ
)
.
This payment is well defined, in particular, when, Γ < 1
since then the above series become absolutely convergent.
Then, the value of the infinite horizon game and the notion
of optimal strategies are defined in a similar manner to the
finite horizon case. The value vector v = (vi)i∈S does exist
and it is characterized as the unique solution of the fixed
point problem
v = T (v) ,
see again [2] for background. We shall see later on that the
assumption Γ < 1 can be relaxed: what matters is that the
discount factor be smaller than one in an “average” sense.
In what follows, it will be convenient to consider a
special class of strategies, determined by policies (feedback,
stationary rules). A policy of player MIN is a map:
σ : S → ∪i∈SAi , i 7→ σ(i) ∈ Ai .
We denote by S the set of all policies of player MIN.
Similarly, a policy of MAX is a map:
τ : ∪i∈S(i, Ai) → ∪i∈S, a∈AiBi,a , (i, a) 7→ τ(i, a) ∈ Bi,a .
Note that since the game is in perfect information, MAX
observes the action a of MIN, and so the policy of player
MAX takes care of this action. We denote by T the set of all
policies of player MAX. It is known that in the discounted
game, there exist optimal strategies associated to policies
(the action is selected at each step by applying a policy of
one player, the policy being the same for all time steps).
These policies are obtained by selecting actions achieving
the minimum and the maximum in the expression of T (v)
in Def. 1. See [2].
Any choice of policies (σ, τ) ∈ S × T defines the
Markovian matrix P στ ∈ Rn×n which determines the state
trajectory if the two players select their actions according to
these policies. i.e., (P στ )ij = P
σ(i)τ(i,σ(i))
ij . Similarly, we
define the nonnegative matrix Mστ with entries (Mστ )ij =
M
σ(i)τ(i,σ(i))
ij . We denote the cardinality of a finite set S by
|S|. We recall that the size of the input is of order |S‖E|.
B. Mean payoff problem
We are now interested in the undiscounted case, in which
the discount factor γ is identically 1. Then we are considering
a two-player perfect information zero-sum Stochastic Mean-
Payoff Game (MPSG), where the main quantity of interest
is the mean payoff vector:
χ(T ) := lim
k→∞
T k(0)/k .
The entry χi(T ) represents the mean payoff per time unit,
if the initial state is i. Here, the mean payoff is defined by
considering a family of games in finite horizon k as k tends
to infinity. There are alternative approaches, in which the
mean payoff is defined as the value of an infinite horizon
game [11]. The property of the uniform value established
in [9] entails that the different natural approaches lead to the
same notion of mean payoff.
The analysis of the mean payoff problem is simplified
when the following non-linear eigenproblem has a solution:
ηe + v = T (v), η ∈ R, v ∈ Rn , (4)
where e := (1 · · · 1)⊤ ∈ Rn is the unit vector. The scalar η
is called the ergodic constant, whereas the vector v, which
is not unique, is called bias or potential. When this equation
is solvable, we have χ(T ) = ηe, i.e., the mean payoff is
independent of the initial state, and it is equal to the ergodic
constant. See e.g. [12] for background.
III. REDUCTION FROM A MEAN PAYOFF PROBLEM TO A
DISCOUNTED ONE
Let u ∈ Rn, we write u ≫ 0 and we say that u is a
positive vector if for all i ∈ [n] := {1, · · · , n}, ui > 0.
Given u≫ 0, we define the weighted sup norm ‖ · ‖u by :
‖x‖u = max
16i6n
xi
ui
= ‖u−1x‖∞ , ∀x ∈ Rn ,
where the notation u−1x := (u−1i xi)i∈[n] refers to the
Hadamard quotient. For x, y ∈ Rn we write x 6 y if xi 6 yi
for all i ∈ [n]. A function f : Rn → Rn is said to be
monotone if for all x, y ∈ Rn, if x 6 y then f(x) 6 f(y).
A. Contraction rate of Shapley operators
We next introduce a notion of recession function associ-
ated to a non-linear map. Our definition is inspired by the
notion of Clarke generalized directional derivative [13, Ch. 2,
S1] of a function f at point z in the direction y
f ′z(y) := lim sup
x→z, s→0+
f(x+ sy)− f(x)
s
. (5)
We next adapt this idea by considering “variations at infinity”
instead of local variations.
Definition 2. Given a function f : Rn → Rn, we define
fˆ : Rn → (R ∪ {+∞})n the Clarke recession function of f
as:
fˆ(y) = sup
s>0, x∈Rn
f(x+ sy)− f(x)
s
. (6)
We chose the name “Clarke recession function” in view
of the similarity between (6) and (5).
The following result is immediate:
Proposition 1. The Clarke recession function is positively
homogeneous and convex.
Theorem 1. Let f : Rn → Rn be a monotone function,
u≫ 0 be a positive vector, and λ ∈ R+. We have fˆ(u) 6 λu
if and only if the function f is λ-contracting in the weighted
sup-norm ‖ · ‖u:
∀x, y ∈ Rn, ‖f(x)− f(y)‖u 6 λ‖x− y‖u .
Following [4, 14], we define the Collatz-Wielandt number
of fˆ as
cw(fˆ) := inf{λ > 0 | ∃u≫ 0; fˆ(u) 6 λu} .
As an immediate consequence of Thm. 1, we get:
Corollary 1. If f : Rn → Rn is monotone, then:
cw(fˆ) = inf{λ ∈ R+ | ∃u≫ 0; f is λ-contracting in ‖·‖u}.
We consider the Shapley operator T : Rn → Rn of Def. 1.
The following "max-max" operator Tmax : Rn → Rn was
considered in [4]
Tmaxi (y) = max
a∈Ai,b∈Bi,a
{Mabi y} , ∀i ∈ S, y ∈ R
n . (7)
In contrast to the Clarke recession function Tˆ , Tmax gener-
ally depends on the choice of the representation of T as a
minimax expression. We next show, however, that Tmax = Tˆ
if all the terms arising in the minimax expression are “useful”
in the following sense.
Definition 3. For a given couple of actions (a, b) of the
two players, we define the set Cabi = {x ∈ R
n | Ti(x) =
rabi + M
ab
i x}. We say that the couple of actions (a, b) is
useful if int(Cabi ) 6= ∅ for all i ∈ [n].
In the one player case, checking whether one action is
useful reduces to checking whether a polyhedron has a non-
empty interior, and this can be done in polynomial time.
Lemma 1. The Clarke recession function of the Shapley
operator T satisfies the following inequality:
Tˆ (y) 6 Tmax(y) , ∀y ∈ Rn . (8)
Moreover, the equality holds if all the actions (a, b) are
useful.
There is an explicit formula for the Collatz-Wielandt
number of Tmax. Recall that the notation Mστ refers to the
nonnegative matrix associated to a pair of policies (end of
Section II-A). We denote by ρ(·) the spectral radius of a
matrix.
Theorem 2 (Corollary of [15]). We have
cw(Tmax) = max
σ∈S ,τ∈T
ρ(Mστ ) .
Owing to Thm. 1 and Lemma 1, we will look for a vector
ϕ≫ 0 such that Tmax(ϕ) 6 λϕ for some λ ∈ [0, 1), to have
that the Shapley operator T is λ−contracting in the weighted
norm ‖ · ‖ϕ. The following special construction allows us to
obtain such a ϕ by solving a non-linear eigenproblem.
Theorem 3 (Th. 7 and proof of Th. 13 in [4]). The following
assertions are equivalent:
1) maxσ∈S ,τ∈T ρ(Mστ ) < 1;
2) there exists a unique vector ϕ ∈ Rn+ such that ϕ =
e+ Tmax(ϕ).
When these assumptions are satisfied, T is λ-contracting in
the weighted norm ‖ · ‖ϕ, with λ := 1−
1
‖ϕ‖∞ .
B. Correspondence between ergodic problems and dis-
counted problems via the h-transform
We consider here the non-linear eigenproblem (4), where
T is the Shapley operator in the undiscounted case, and
describe a technique introduced in [4] to reduce this equation
to a fixed point equation of a contracting operator. Recall
that (4) allows one to solve the mean-payoff problem. As
noted above, the vector v solution of (4) is not unique. In
particular, if v is a solution then v+αe also yields a solution
for all α ∈ R. Hence, we shall distinguish a special state
c ∈ S and require vc = 0.
Definition 4. For a Markov matrix P and states i, j, we
denote:
Tij(P ) := E[inf{k > 1 | Xk = j} | X0 = i]
the expected first hitting time of state j, for a Markov chain
Xk with transition matrix P and initial state i.
Given c ∈ S, it is easy to see that Tic(P ) < +∞ for all
i ∈ S if and only if P has a unique final (recurrent) class and
that c belongs to this class. A state c with the latter property
is called a renewal state.
Definition 5. For any matrix P ∈ Rn×n, we denote by
P(c) ∈ R
n×n the matrix obtained from P by replacing the
column c of P with zeros. We denote by Pi the ith row of
P , so that Pi = (Pij)j∈[n], and we use a similar notation for
matrices constructed from P , e.g., P(c)i = ((P(c))ij)j∈[n].
Lemma 2. Let c ∈ S be a given state. The following
assertions are equivalent:
1) For all (σ, τ) ∈ S ×T , P στ has a unique final class,
and the state c is common to each of these classes;
2) Tic := maxσ∈S ,τ∈T Tic(P στ ) < +∞, ∀i ∈ S;
3) maxσ∈S ,τ∈T ρ(P στ(c) ) < 1.
4) There is a unique vector ϕ⋆ solution of the equation:
ϕ⋆ = e+ max
σ∈S ,τ∈T
[P στ(c)ϕ
⋆] , (9)
Under these assumptions, we have ϕ⋆i = Tic, for all i ∈ S.
In the rest of this section, we make the following assump-
tion.
Assumption 1. There exists a state c ∈ S satisfying the
conditions of Lemma 2.
We can find such a state c if it exists, or certify that there
is none, in quasi-linear time by using directed hypergraphs
techniques, along the lines of [16]; details will be given
elsewhere.
Let ϕ ∈ Rn+, ϕ≫ 0, and R
n
c := {x ∈ R
n | xc = 0}.
Definition 6. For a nonnegative matrix P ∈ Rn×n, if ϕi >
1+P(c)iϕ, ∀i ∈ S, then we denote by P(c,ϕ) the nonnegative
matrix obtained from P by replacing the column c by the
vector ϕ−1c (ϕ− 1− P(c)ϕ).
Lemma 3. Let η ∈ R, v ∈ Rn with vc = 0 and P ∈ Rn×n.
We have η(ϕ − 1) + Pv = P(c,ϕ)(ηϕ + v). In particular
P(c,ϕ)ϕ = ϕ− 1.
Proposition 2. The map Lϕ : (η, v) 7→ w = η + ϕ
−1v from
R × Rnc to R
n, is an isomorphism, with inverse given by
w 7→ (η, v) with η = wc and v = ϕ(w − wc).
Definition 7. For any self-map f of Rn, we denote by Lϕ(f)
the self-map of Rn, such that for all w, v ∈ Rn and η ∈ R
with vc = 0 and w = η + ϕ−1v, we have
Lϕ(f)(w) = ϕ
−1(η(ϕ− 1) + f(v)) .
Remark 1. For a matrix P we have by Lemma 3
Lϕ(P )(w) = Pϕw where Pϕ ∈ Rn×n is the nonnegative
matrix given by Pϕ,ij := ϕ
−1
i P(c,ϕ)ijϕj , (i, j) ∈ S
2, so that
Pϕ,ij =
{
ϕ−1i Pijϕj , if j 6= c, i ∈ S
1− ϕ−1i −
∑
k 6=c ϕ
−1
i Pikϕk, if j = c, i ∈ S
.
We consider the Shapley operator in the undiscounted case
Ti(v) = min
a∈Ai
max
b∈Bi,a
{
rabi + P
ab
i v
}
, ∀i ∈ S, ∀v ∈ Rn.
(10)
By Lemma 2, we know that there exists a vector ϕ ∈ Rn+,
such that
ϕi > 1 + max
a,b
[P ab(c)iϕ], ∀i ∈ S . (11)
So we can define as above a monotone operator Tϕ :=
Lϕ(T ), and we verify easily that
Tϕi (w) = min
a∈Ai
max
b∈Bi,a
{
ϕ−1i r
ab
i + P
ab
ϕ,iw
}
. (12)
Lemma 4. If there exists a vector ϕ ∈ Rn+ such that ϕi >
1+maxa,b[P
ab
(c)iϕ] for all i ∈ S, then T
ϕ is λϕ−contracting
in the sup-norm ‖ · ‖∞, with λϕ := 1 − 1/‖ϕ‖∞. Tϕ can
be interpreted as a Shapley operator of a discounted game
with discount factors 6 λϕ.
Remark 2. The vector ϕ⋆ defined by (9) is solution of a
fixed point equation of the form ϕ⋆ = F (ϕ⋆) where the
map F is order preserving and contracting in the norm
‖ · ‖ϕ⋆ . It follows that if w ∈ Rn+, verifies wi > 1 +
maxa,b[P
ab
(c)iw], ∀i ∈ S, then, w > ϕ
⋆. Similarly, if wi 6
1 + maxa,b P
ab
(c,ϕ)iw, ∀i ∈ S then w 6 ϕ
⋆.
Theorem 4. The non-linear eigenproblem
ηe+ v = T (v) , (13)
where η ∈ R and v ∈ Rn with vc = 0, can be reduced to
the fixed point problem:
Tϕ(w) = w , (14)
where w ∈ Rn such that w = η + ϕ−1v. Equation (14) has
a unique solution w⋆.
We verify easily that for w ∈ Rn, and i ∈ S we have
Tϕi (w) = min
a∈Ai
max
b∈Bi,a
{
ϕ−1i P
ab
i ϕ(w − wce)
+ϕ−1i r
ab
i + wc(1− ϕ
−1
i )
}
, ∀i ∈ S.
(15)
Lemma 5. The solution w⋆ of equation (14) satisfies
‖w⋆‖∞ 6 R.
Example 1. We give an elementary illustration of the present
deflation+h-transform technique. Let P = ( 0 11 0 ), r ∈ R
2,
and consider T (x) = r + Px. Let us choose c = 1. The
first hitting time vector ϕ⋆ is such that ϕ⋆2 = 1 and ϕ
⋆
1 =
1+ϕ⋆2 = 2, so ‖ϕ
⋆‖∞ = 2. The operator Tϕ
⋆
given by (15)
specializes to Tϕ(w1, w2) = (
r1
2 +
w2
2 , r2). In accordance
with Lemma 4, this operator is 1/2−contracting. The unique
fixed point of Tϕ is w = ((r1 + r2)/2, r2) = ηe + ϕ−1v,
from which, by Thm. 4, we recover the mean payoff η =
(r1 + r2)/2, and v = (0, (r2 − r1)/2).
IV. VARIANCE REDUCED VALUE ITERATION FOR
STRUCTURED STOCHASTIC GAMES
To solve the non-linear eigenproblem (13), we will find
a vector ϕ satisfying (11) by solving (9) in an approximate
way, and then use ϕ to define the new operator (12) and solve
the discounted problem (14). We next present a variant of the
method of Sidford et al. [3] to deal with a structured input,
which will allow us to handle both problems (9) and (14).
We consider a perfect information two-player zero-sum
stochastic game with general discount (SG) as described in
sec. II, except that we suppose that P στ is a sub-Markovian
matrix for each couple of policies (σ, τ) ∈ S × T . We
suppose the associated Shapley operator can be written as
Ti(w) = min
a∈Ai
max
b∈Bi,a
{
γabi P
ab
i Lw +G
ab
i (w)
}
, ∀i ∈ S. (16)
Here L ∈ Rn×n is a sparse operator such that for all w ∈
R
n, Lw can be computed in O(|S|). For all i ∈ S, a ∈
Ai, b ∈ Bi,a,Gabi is a sparse affine operator such thatG
ab
i (w)
can be computed in O(1) for all w ∈ Rn. For example, by
taking L = Id and Gabi (w) = r
ab
i , ∀w ∈ R
n we obtain
the Shapley operator of the stochastic game with general
discount. The operator L will allow us to handle the deflation
(pre-subtraction of wce) in Eq. (15).
The problem that we want to solve is:
T (w) = w . (17)
In this section, we make the following assumption:
Assumption 2. • T is λ−contracting under the weighted
norm ‖ · ‖ψ, where ψ ∈ Rn is a positive vector.
• The solution w⋆ of the equation (17) verifies ‖w⋆‖ψ 6
W , where W > 0 is a scalar.
We can easily show the following inequalities:
‖ψ−1‖−1∞ ‖w‖ψ 6 ‖w‖∞ 6 ‖ψ‖∞‖w‖ψ ∀w ∈ R
n .
Remark 3. In the following, the values ‖ψ−1‖∞ and ‖ψ‖∞
can be replaced by any positive scalars d1, d2 > 0 such that
‖ψ−1‖∞ 6 d1 and ‖ψ‖∞ 6 d2.
We denote also by ‖ · ‖∞ the operator norm associated to
the sup-norm, so that we have:
‖Mw‖∞ 6 ‖M‖∞‖w‖∞, ∀w ∈ Rn, ∀M ∈ Rn×n.
To a given vector p = (pj)j∈S with pj > 0, ∀j ∈ S
and
∑
j∈S pj 6 1, we associate the probability vector p¯ =
(p¯j)j∈S∪{0} with p¯j = pj , ∀j ∈ S and p¯0 = 1−
∑
j∈S pj .
For each i ∈ S, a ∈ Ai, b ∈ Bi,a, we suppose that we can
sample under the probability P¯ abi associated to the vector
P abi in time O(1).
We next adapt the algorithms 1− 6 presented by Sidford
et al. in [3] to our case with two players. We follow
the presentation of [3], including the decomposition of the
algorithm in elementary subroutines. The necessary changes
arise from the use of the weighted sup-norm ‖ · ‖ψ instead
of ‖ · ‖∞, from the sub-Markovian character of the matrices.
In the following, Algorithm 1 computes an approximation
of P abi u by sampling under the probability vector P¯
ab
i . Al-
gorithm 2 computes an approximation of T (w) for w ∈ Rn,
given an initial vector w0 ∈ Rn. This algorithm assumes that
an approximation of the terms xabi = P
ab
i Lw0, called offsets
in [3], is already known. Then, Algorithm 3 implements a
randomized value iteration, using Algorithm 2 at each itera-
tion. To initialize Algorithm 3, the offsets xabi = P
ab
i Lw0 are
computed exactly. Algorithm 4 iterates Algorithm 3, using
the technique of variance reduction by dividing the error by
2 at every iteration. Algorithm 5 and Algorithm 6 are similar
to Algorithm 3 and Algorithm 4, with the difference that the
offsets are sampled, instead of being computed exactly.
Algorithm 1 Approximate transition with cemetery:
ApxTransC(u,M, i, a, b, ǫ, δ)
1: ⊲ Input: vector u ∈ Rn and M > 0 such that we have
‖u‖∞ 6 M
2: ⊲ Input: State i ∈ S and actions a ∈ Ai, b ∈ Bi,a
3: ⊲ Input: Target accuracy ǫ > 0, failure probability δ ∈ (0, 1)
4: u0 = 0
5: m = ⌈ 2M
2
ǫ2
ln( 2
δ
)⌉
6: for k ∈ [m] do choose ik ∈ S∪{0} with probabilities P(ik =
j) = P¯ abij for j ∈ S ∪ {0}.
7: done
8: return Y = 1
m
∑
k∈[m] uik
Algorithm 2 Structured approximate value operator:
SApxVal(w,w0, x, ǫ, δ)
1: ⊲ Input: Current vector w ∈ Rn and initial vector w0 ∈ R
n.
2: ⊲ Input: Precomputed offsets: x ∈ RE with |xabi −
P abi Lw0| 6 ǫ for all i ∈ S, a ∈ Ai, b ∈ Bi,a.
3: ⊲ Input: Target accuracy ǫ > 0, failure probability δ ∈ (0, 1)
4: M = ‖L‖∞‖w − w0‖∞
5: u = L(w − w0)
6: for i ∈ S do
7: for a ∈ Ai do
8: for b ∈ Bi,a do
9: S˜abi = x
ab
i + ApxTransC(u,M, i, a, b, ǫ,
δ
|E|
)
10: Q˜abi = γ
ab
i S˜
ab
i +G
ab
i (w)
11: done
12: w˜ai = maxb∈Bi,a Q˜
ab
i , τ (i, a) ∈ argmax
b∈Bi,a
Q˜abi
13: done
14: w˜i = mina∈Ai w˜
a
i , σ(i) ∈ argmin
a∈Ai
w˜ai
15: done
16: return (w˜, σ, τ )
Lemma 6 (adaptation of Lem. 4.2 in [3]). Algorithm 1 runs
in time O(M2ǫ−2 log(1
δ
)), and it outputs Y such that |Y −
P abi u| 6 ǫ with probability 1− δ.
Lemma 7 (adaptation of Lem. 4.3 in [3]). With probability
1−δ, Algorithm 2 returns w˜ such that ‖w˜−T (w)‖∞ 6 2Γǫ,
Algorithm 3 Structured randomized value iteration:
SRandVI(w0, J, ǫ, δ)
1: ⊲ Input: initial vector w0 ∈ R
n, number of iterations J > 0
2: ⊲ Input: Target accuracy ǫ > 0, failure probability δ ∈ (0, 1)
3: Compute x ∈ RE such that xabi = P
ab
i Lw0 for all i ∈ S and
a ∈ Ai, b ∈ Bi,a.
4: for j ∈ [J ] do (wj , σj , τj) = SApxVal(wj−1, w0, x, ǫ,
δ
J
)
5: done
6: return (wJ , σJ , τJ )
Algorithm 4 Structured high precision randomized value
iteration:
SHighPrecisionRandVI(ǫ, δ, λ,W, Γ, ‖ψ−1‖∞, ‖ψ‖∞)
1: ⊲ Input: Target accuracy ǫ > 0, failure probability δ ∈ (0, 1)
2: Let K = ⌈log2(
‖ψ‖∞W
ǫ
)⌉ and J = ⌈ 1
1−λ
log(4)⌉
3: w0 = 0 and ǫ0 = W
4: for k ∈ [K] do
5: ǫk =
ǫk−1
2
= W
2k
6: (wk, σk, τk) = SRandVI(wk−1, J,
1−λ
4‖ψ−1‖∞Γ
ǫk, δ/K)
7: done
8: return (wK , σK , τK)
and then ‖w˜−T (w)‖ψ 6 2‖ψ
−1‖∞Γǫ, and it runs in time:
O
(
|E|
⌈
‖w − w0‖
2
∞‖L‖
2
∞ǫ
−2 log
( |E|
δ
)⌉)
.
Lemma 8. If w,w′ ∈ Rn satisfy ‖w′ − T (w)‖ψ 6 α then
‖w′ − w⋆‖ψ 6 α+ λ‖w − w⋆‖ψ.
Lemma 9 (adaptation of Lem. 4.5 in [3]). The sequence
(wj)j∈[J] generated by Algorithm 3 satisfies with probability
1− δ, that for all j ∈ [J ]:
‖wj −w
⋆‖ψ 6
2‖ψ−1‖∞Γǫ
1− λ
+exp(−j(1−λ))‖w0−w
⋆‖ψ
and if J > ⌈ 11−λ log(
‖w0−w⋆‖ψ(1−λ)
2‖ψ−1‖∞Γǫ )⌉ then ‖wJ −w
⋆‖ψ 6
4‖ψ−1‖∞Γǫ
1−λ .
Lemma 10 (adaptation of Lem. 4.6 in [3]). Algorithm 3 runs
in time
O
(
|S‖E|+ J |E|
[
‖ψ‖2∞‖w0 − w
⋆‖2ψ
ǫ2
+
Γ 2‖ψ‖2∞‖ψ
−1‖2∞
(1− λ)2
]
‖L‖2∞ log
( |E|J
δ
))
.
Lemma 11 (adaptation of Lem. 4.8 and Lem. 4.9 in [3]).
Algorithm 4 gives with probability 1− δ that ‖wk−w⋆‖ψ 6
ǫk for all k ∈ [0,K], in particular ‖wK − w
⋆‖ψ 6
ǫ
‖ψ‖∞
and then ‖wK − w⋆‖∞ 6 ǫ, and runs in time1:
O˜
((
|S‖E|+
|E|Γ 2
(1 − λ)3
‖ψ‖2∞‖ψ
−1‖2∞
)
‖L‖2∞log(
W
ǫ
) log(
1
δ
)
)
.
Lemma 12 (adaptation of Lem. 4.10 and Lem. 4.12 in [3]).
Algorithm 6 gives with probability 1− δ that ‖wk−w⋆‖ψ 6
ǫk for all k ∈ [0,K], in particular ‖wK − w⋆‖ψ 6
ǫ
‖ψ‖∞
1As in [3] we use O˜ to hide polylogarithmic factors in the input
parameters, i.e. O˜(f(x)) = O(f(x) log(f(x))O(1)).
Algorithm 5 Structured sampled randomized value iteration:
SSampledRandVI(w0, J, ǫ, δ)
1: ⊲ Input: initial vector w0 ∈ R
n, number of iterations J > 0
2: ⊲ Input: Target accuracy ǫ > 0, failure probability δ ∈ (0, 1)
3: Sample to obtain approximate offsets: x˜ ∈ RE such that with
probability 1 − δ
2
, |x˜abi − P
ab
i Lw0| 6 ǫ for all i ∈ S and
a ∈ Ai, b ∈ Bi,a:
x˜abi = ApxTransC(w0, ‖L‖∞‖w0‖∞, i, a, b, ǫ,
δ
2|E|
)
4: for j ∈ [J ] do (wj , σj , τj) = SApxVal(wj−1, w0, x˜, ǫ,
δ
2J
)
5: done
6: return (wJ , σJ , τJ )
Algorithm 6 Structured sublinear randomized value itera-
tion: SSublinearRandVI(ǫ, δ, λ,W, Γ, ‖ψ−1‖∞, ‖ψ‖∞)
1: ⊲ Input: Target accuracy ǫ > 0, failure probability δ ∈ (0, 1)
2: Let K = ⌈log2(
‖ψ‖∞W
ǫ
)⌉ and J = ⌈ 1
1−λ
log(4)⌉
3: w0 = 0 and ǫ0 = W
4: for k ∈ [K] do
5: ǫk =
ǫk−1
2
= W
2k
6: (wk, σk, τk)=SSampledRandVI(wk−1, J,
(1−λ)ǫk
4‖ψ−1‖∞Γ
, δ
K
)
7: done
8: return (wK , σK , τK)
and then ‖wK − w⋆‖∞ 6 ǫ, and runs in time
O˜
(
|E|Γ 2‖ψ‖2∞‖ψ
−1‖2∞
[
‖ψ‖2∞W
2
(1− λ)2ǫ2
+
1
(1− λ)3
]
‖L‖2∞ log(
1
δ
)
)
.
V. VARIANCE REDUCED DEFLATED VALUE ITERATION
FOR ERGODIC PROBLEMS
To solve the mean-payoff problem of sec. II-B, we con-
sider the equation:
ηe+ v = T (v) and vc = 0, η ∈ R, v ∈ R
n (18)
where T is as in Def. 1: Ti(v) = mina∈Ai maxb∈Bi,a
{
rabi +∑
j∈S P
ab
ij vj
}
, ∀i ∈ S. Throughout the section, we make
Assumption 1. We denote by (η⋆, v⋆) the unique solution
of this problem. We know by Lemma 2 that there exists a
vector ϕ ∈ Rn+ satisfying (11).
Thm. 4 shows that (18) is equivalent to the equation:
Tϕ(w) = w, w ∈ Rn , (19)
with η = wc, v = ϕ(w − wc), and Tϕ is given by (15).
A. Computing an h-transform of the ergodic problem
Here we want to find a vector ϕ ∈ Rn+ satisfying (11).
First, we consider the problem of finding the vector of
maximal expected first hitting times of state c, denoted ϕ⋆
as in (9), and we suppose that we know a bound H on it:
H > ‖ϕ⋆‖∞ = max
i∈S
Tic . (20)
We define the scalar λ ∈ [0, 1) by
λ := 1− 1/H > 1− 1/‖ϕ⋆‖∞ . (21)
We remark that the component ϕ⋆c can be computed
in time O(|E|) from the other components since ϕ⋆c =
1+maxa∈Ai,b∈Bi,a [
∑
j∈S,j 6=c P
ab
ij ϕ
⋆
j ]. By considering w
⋆ =
(ϕ⋆i )i∈S\{c} ∈ R
n−1 and the matrices P˜ στ ∈ R(n−1)×(n−1)
defined from P στ by removing the c row and the c column,
the problem becomes
w⋆ = Tm(w⋆) , (22)
where the operator Tm is such that
Tmi (w) = 1 +max
a,b
[P˜ abi w], ∀i ∈ S \ {c}, ∀w ∈ R
n−1
The operator Tm is a particular case of the operator T in
(17): for (σ, τ) ∈ S ×T , P στ = P˜ στ are sub-Markovian.
For (i, a, b) ∈ E, γabi = 1 and then Γ = 1, G
ab
i (w) = 1 for
all w ∈ Rn−1 and L is the identity then ‖L‖∞ = 1.
From Thm. 3 and Eq. (21), we know that the operator
Tm is µ−contracting in the sup-norm ‖ · ‖w⋆ , with µ :=
1 − 1/‖w⋆‖∞ 6 1 − 1/‖ϕ⋆‖∞ 6 λ, so here we take ψ =
w⋆, and λ as contraction rate. We have ‖w⋆−1‖∞ 6 1 and
‖w⋆‖∞ 6 ‖ϕ⋆‖∞ 6 11−λ , then according to Remark 3 we
can take in Algorithm 4 and Algorithm 6 the scalars 1 and
1
1−λ instead of ‖w
⋆−1‖∞ and ‖w⋆‖∞ respectively. We have
‖w⋆‖w⋆ = 1, then we take W = 1.
We use Algorithm 4 and Algorithm 6 to find an
ǫ−approximation of w⋆ in near linear and sublinear time
respectively. Then we can deduce ϕ′ an ǫ−approximation
of ϕ⋆. By taking ǫ = 14 and considering ϕ = 2ϕ
′, we
deduce the following Thm. 5 and Thm. 6. In both theorems
λϕ := 1− 1/‖ϕ‖∞ satisfies 11−λϕ 6
2
1−λ +
1
2 .
Theorem 5. By calling Algorithm 4, we can find ϕ ∈ Rn+
such that ϕi > 1 + maxa,b[P
ab
(c)iϕ] for all i ∈ S, in time
O˜
((
|S‖E|+
|E|
(1− λ)5
)
log(
1
δ
)
)
.
Theorem 6. By calling Algorithm 6, we can find ϕ ∈ Rn+
such that ϕi > 1 + maxa,b[P
ab
(c)iϕ] for all i ∈ S in time
O˜
(
|E|
(1 − λ)6
log(
1
δ
)
)
.
B. Solving the ergodic problem
We suppose that we have identified a vector ϕ satisfying
(11). Now we consider the equation (19).
As in sec. IV, we can write Tϕ in the general form given
by Eq. (16), where γabi = ϕ
−1
i for all i ∈ S, a ∈ Ai, b ∈ Bi,a
and then Γ = max(i,a,b)∈E γabi 6 1, L : w 7→ ϕ(w − wce)
is a sparse linear operator and we have ‖L‖∞ 6 2‖ϕ‖∞ =
2
1−λϕ and G
ab
i : w 7→ ϕ
−1
i r
ab
i +wc(1−ϕ
−1
i ) is also a sparse
affine operator for all i ∈ S, a ∈ Ai, b ∈ Bi,a.
By Lemma 4, Tϕ is a λϕ−contraction in the sup-norm
‖ · ‖∞, where λϕ = 1 − 1/‖ϕ‖∞. We take here ψ = e,
which means ‖ · ‖ψ = ‖ · ‖∞ and ‖ψ−1‖∞ = ‖ψ‖∞ = 1.
By Lemma 5, we have ‖w⋆‖∞ 6 R, where w⋆ is the
solution of Eq. (19). So we take W = R.
The following theorems give an approximation for w⋆ and
then also for v⋆ and η⋆ in nearly linear time with Thm. 7
(based on Thm. 5 and Lemma 11), and in sublinear time
with Thm. 8 (based on Thm. 6 and Lemma 12). The time
complexities considered include the times needed to find ϕ.
Theorem 7. With probability 1 − δ, we find
ϕ satisfying (11) and the call of Algorithm 4,
SHighPrecisionRandVI(ǫ, δ2 , λϕ, R, 1, 1, 1) returns
w ∈ Rn such that ‖w − w⋆‖∞ 6 ǫ. Therefore we obtain
η = wc and v = ϕ(w − wce) such that |η − η⋆| 6 ǫ and
‖v − v⋆‖∞ 6 5ǫ1−λ . The run time needed is
O˜
((
|S‖E|+
|E|
(1− λ)5
)
log(
R
ǫ
) log(
1
δ
)
)
.
Theorem 8. With probability 1 − δ, we find
ϕ satisfying (11) and the call of Algorithm 6,
SSublinearRandVI(ǫ, δ2 , λϕ, R, 1, 1, 1) returns w ∈ R
n
such that ‖w − w⋆‖∞ 6 ǫ. Therefore we obtain η = wc
and v = ϕ(w − wce) such that |η − η⋆| 6 ǫ and
‖v − v⋆‖∞ 6 5ǫ1−λ . The run time needed is
O˜
(
|E|
[
R2
(1− λ)4ǫ2
+
1
(1 − λ)6
]
log(
1
δ
)
)
.
VI. COMPARISON WITH ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES
A. A cyclic example: no contraction or mixing
The convergence proof of the sampled relative value
iteration in [7] requires the Dobrushin ergodicity coefficient
α = 1− min
i,j∈[n],a∈Ai,a′∈Aj
∑
k∈[n]
min(P aik, P
a′
jk) (23)
to be smaller than 1. Consider the 0-player instance with a
cyclic matrix P , presented in Ex. 1. Here, α = 1, and actu-
ally, relative value iteration does not converge. Moreover, the
mixing time used in the bound of [8] is infinite. However, as
shown in Ex. 1, the deflation+h-transform methods reduces
to a fixed point problem with a contraction rate of 1/2.
B. An example with small hitting times
Let us first consider a 0−player problem with state space
[n], T (v) = r +Qv, ∀v ∈ Rn, where r ∈ Rn fixed and the
probability transition matrix Q ∈ Rn×n, such that
Qi,1 = Qi,i+1 = 1/2, i ∈ [n− 1], Qn,1 = 1 .
We can easily prove that the expected first return time to
state n is Tcc = Ω(2n). If we denote by ν the stationary
distribution of Q, it follows that νn = O(2−n). In [8], one
supposes the stationary distribution of Q satisfies 1√
τn
e 6
ν 6
√
τ
n
e, so, τ = Ω(22n/n2). The complexity bound of [8]
is exponential in this example, since it includes a τ2 factor.
By using our technique, we will first choose c = 1 and
we verify easily that the first hitting time vector ϕ⋆ satisfies
‖ϕ⋆‖∞ 6 2 (more precisely ϕ⋆i = 2−
1
2n−i , ∀i ∈ [n]). Then
the new operator Tϕ
⋆
is 1/2−contracting which leads to fast
convergence. In particular, Thm. 7 gives a time complexity
O˜(n2 log(R
ǫ
) log(1
δ
)), and Thm. 8 gives a time complexity
O˜(nR
2
ǫ2
log(1
δ
)), whereR is an upper bound on the payments,
ǫ is the target accuracy and δ is the failure probability.
In this 0-player example, α = 1/2, so we could use
relative value iteration. This is no longer the case if we
consider the following 1-player variant. By identifying n+1
and 1, consider the stochastic matrix
Q′i+1,2 = Q
′
i+1,i+2 =
1
2
, i ∈ [n− 1], Q′1,2 = 1 .
let r′ ∈ Rn be a vector of payments, and consider the
Bellman operator T (x) = max(r + Qx, r′ + Q′x), so that
there are two actions in every state. Now, α = 1 and
the convergence of the relative value iteration [7] is not
guaranteed. However, we observe that for all policies, the
probability to reach the set of states {1, 2} in one step is
at least 1/2. Moreover, for all actions, the probability of
the transition 1 → 2 is at least 1/2. It follows that by
choosing c = 2, the vector of maximal hitting times ϕ⋆
satisfies ‖ϕ⋆‖∞ 6 4 (more precisely ϕ⋆1 = 2 and ϕ
⋆
i =
4− 12n−i , ∀i ∈ {2, · · · , n}). Hence, the deflation+h-transform
method still has a sublinear behavior on this example.
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